In his recent The Parmenidean Ascent, Michael Della Rocca develops a regress-theoretic case, reminiscent of F.H. Bradley’s famous argument in Appearance and Reality, against the intelligibility of relations and in favor of a monistic conception of reality. I argue that Della Rocca illicitly supposes that “internal” relations – in one sense of that word – lead to a “chain” regress, a regress of relations relating relations and relata. In contrast, I contend that if “internal” or grounded (...) relations lead to a regress at all, it is a kind of “fission” regress within the relata themselves, and that a chain regress for relations only arises, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. In this way, I contend that Della Rocca pursues a regress for so-called “internal” or grounded relations that only arises, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. I compare Della Rocca’s case against relations with Bradley’s reasoning in Appearance and Reality, and suggest in this context that Bradley may, perhaps, have the upper hand. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest a new interpretation of the relations of inherence, causation and conception in Spinoza. I discuss the views of Don Garrett on this issue and argue against Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception. I argue that Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and that Della Rocca's suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or (...) friendly amendment to Spinoza 's system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system. -/- In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett's and Della Rocca's interpretations. In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca's reading. In the third and final part, I present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza ; and finally, defend and justify the presence of bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza 's system. (shrink)

Michael Della Rocca has provided an influential interpretation of Spinoza relying heavily on the principle of sufficient reason. In order to challenge this interpretation, I identify three assumptions Della Rocca makes about the PSR and demonstrate that it is not clear Spinoza shares them. First, Della Rocca contends that the PSR is unlimited in scope. I show that the scope of Spinoza’s version of the PSR is ambiguous. While it is clear that substances and (...) modes are included, it is unclear just how widely the scope extends. Second, Della Rocca argues that the PSR demands there are no illegitimate bifurcations. I argue that Della Rocca’s account of illegitimate bifurcations is too strong. I show that Spinoza offers a distinction in explanatory types that should be considered illegitimate and inexplicable according to Della Rocca’s definition of illegitimate bifurcations. Third, Della Rocca argues that explanations which satisfy the demands of the PSR must be in terms of the concepts involved. I show that Spinoza does not use conceptual explanations. Instead, in almost all cases, the explanations Spinoza relies on to satisfy the demands of the PSR are in terms of a thing’s cause. (shrink)

Spinoza’s metaphysical concept of striving (conatus) entails that all particular things without exception partake in the similar goal of self-preservation. From this position, he derives psychological principles for humans that account for social behavior in terms of one’s effort to preserve one’s community. His position stands in opposition to common sense descriptions of ‘unselfish’ behaviors such as altruism and Michael Della Rocca’s formulation of “other directed striving.” Spinoza accounts for humans acting in the interest of others via community, (...) without compromising his metaphysics or rigorous commitment to naturalism. His explanations outline a means to act socially that minimizes the threat violent emotions pose to political harmony. (shrink)

The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca’s outstanding Spinoza book (Della Rocca 2008a) is that at the very center of Spinoza’s philosophy stands the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): the stipulation that everything must be explainable or, in other words, the rejection of any brute facts. Della Rocca rightly ascribes to Spinoza a strong version of the PSR. It is not only that the actual existence and features of all things must be explicable, but (...) even the inexistence – as well as the absence of any feature of any thing – demands an explanation. Della Rocca does not stop here, however. He feeds his PSR monster with some more powerful steroids and suggests that Spinoza advocates what he terms “the twofold use of the PSR.” It is not only that everything must be explained and made intelligible, but it must ultimately be explained in terms of explainability or intelligibility itself. This twofold use of the PSR is the key to the entire book. Della Roca’s strategy throughout the book is to argue that any key feature of Spinoza’s system – be it causality, inherence, essence, consciousness, existence, rejection of teleology, goodness or political right – must be explained, and ultimately it must be explained in terms of intelligibility. “Spinoza single-mindedly digs and digs until we find that the phenomenon in question is nothing but some form of intelligibility itself, of explicability itself” (Della Rocca 2008a: 2). Della Rocca’s book came out together with a cluster of articles in which he develops in detail his new reading of Spinoza. In one of these articles, he warns the reader: “Don’t let me start” (Dell Rocca 2010: 1). The train that is about to embark leads to very bizarre terrain, and thus one should think twice before embarking on the “PSR Express.” In this paper I argue that the train was hijacked. This was a perfect crime: without anyone noticing it, the engine driver diverted the train to a new route, and as with other perfect crimes, it is none but the criminal himself who is capable of, and indeed will, bring about his own demise. As I will later argue, Della Rocca’s “PSR-on-steroids” will eventually cripple reason itself. But let us not run too fast, and start at the very beginning. I happily – or at least, so I think - board the “PSR Express.” I believe Spinoza is strongly committed to the PSR and makes very significant use of this principle, but, unlike Della Rocca, I do not think the PSR is the key to all mysteries Spinozist, nor do I believe Spinoza was committed to the reductionist program of explaining all things through intelligibility (i.e., the second use of the PSR). (shrink)

In two recent papers, Michael Della Rocca accuses Descartes of reasoning circularly in the Fourth Meditation. This alleged new circle is distinct from, and more vicious than, the traditional Cartesian Circle arising in the Third Meditation. We explain Della Rocca’s reasons for this accusation, showing that his argument is invalid.

Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, the main proposition of which claims, “[e]ach thing, to the extent it is in itself, strives [conatur] to persevere in its being” (E3p6), has been the subject of growing interest. This is understandable, for Spinoza’s psychology and ethics are based on this doctrine. In my paper I shall examine the way Spinoza argues for E3p6 in its demonstration which runs as follows: "For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate (...) way (by 1p25c), i.e. (by 1p34), things that express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts. And no thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by p4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by p5). Therefore, to the extent it can, and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being." This argument has been severely criticized for being defective in many ways. E3p6d contains four items, E1p25c, 1p34, 3p4, and 3p5. Most often, only the two last mentioned are regarded as doing any real work in the demonstration. However, I shall argue that having a proper grasp of Spinoza’s concept of power enables us see that the demonstration’s beginning, built on E1p25c and 1p34, brings forth a certain dynamic framework in which finite things are centers of causal power, capable of producing effects in virtue of their essences. My examination of this framework shows the beginning of the demonstration to be irreplaceable: in the end, conatus is one form of power, and E1p25c and 1p34 not only bring the notion of power into play, but also inform us on how finite things’ power should be understood in the monistic system. So, I disagree with such commentators as Jonathan Bennett, Edwin Curley, Daniel Garber, Michael Della Rocca, and Richard Manning, who see Spinoza as trying to derive the conatus doctrine from E3p4 and 3p5 alone; and I agree with Alexandre Matheron, Henry Allison, and Martin Lin, who stress the importance of E1p25c and 1p34. -/- However, this still leaves us the task of reconstructing the whole derivation and showing how its various ingredients fit together. If E1p25c and 1p34 are so important, could E3p6 not be derived from them alone, as Martin Lin has argued? In other words, why are E3p4 and 3p5 needed at all? To answer these questions I shall provide an interpretation of E3p6d that explains how the argument is supposed to work. E1p25c and 1p34 say that finite things are, in essence, dynamic causers, which, in case of opposition, truly resist opposing factors with their power and do not simply cease their causal activities whenever facing obstacles; in other words, they strive against any opposition. However, this is not enough to guarantee that they could not act self-destructively or restrain their own power, which would make them incapable of self-preservation. But this would go against E3p4, “No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause,” and Spinoza uses it to claim, “no thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away.” So all this allows Spinoza to hold that finite things are consistent causers, that is, entities endowed with power and, insofar they cause effects solely in virtue of their essence, they never use their power self-destructively. The significance and role of the final item in the demonstration, E3p5 (“Things are of a contrary nature, i.e., cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other”), still needs to be determined. Indeed, considering its content and the way it is used in the demonstration, it seems to be a surprisingly decisive ingredient in the argument. Namely, what “each thing, to the extent it is in itself,” that is, insofar as any thing is considered disregarding everything external to it, strives to preserve, is its being (esse), not simply its present state. This together with E3p5’s view of subjecthood – which I shall explicate in my paper – suggests that we should rethink what kind of “being” or “existence” is meant in E3p6. Indeed, for Spinoza, each subject has a definable essence from which, as far as the subject in question is in itself, certain properties or effects necessarily follow; consequently a subject’s full being involves not only instantiating a certain essence, but also those properties inferable from the essence-expressing definition. Thus, E3p5 is meant to bring forward that things are not merely non-self-destroyers but subjects from whose definitions properties follow; and as Spinoza thinks to have shown (by E1p25c and 1p34) that finite modifications are entities endowed with power, any subject has true power to produce the properties or effects derivable from its definition, which, Spinoza claims, implies opposing everything harmful. In other words, things exercise power as their definition states, i.e. according to their definitions, and thus bringing in the idea of things as expressers of power enables Spinoza to convert logical oppositions (of E3p5) into real ones (of E3p6). To summarize, Spinoza reasons that each true finite thing is, in itself, an expresser of power (E1p25c, 1p34) that never acts self-destructively (E3p4) but instead strives to drive itself through opponents to produce effects as they follow from the definition of the thing in question (E1p25c, 1p34, and 3p5). Therefore, “each thing, to the extent it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.” The demonstration of E3p6 has its roots deep in Spinoza’s ontology, and since its concept of power is supposed to provide the metaphysical grounding for real opposition, the importance of E1p25c and 1p34 should not be underestimated just because Spinoza – as often happens – puts his point exceedingly briefly. Moreover, the derivation is basically valid and contains no superfluous elements. Finally, all this tells us something decisive about the meaning of Spinoza’s doctrine: according to it, things are active causers whose “power to exist and act” has conatus character in temporality, amounting not only to striving to prolong the duration of one’s actualization but also to striving to be as active or autonomous as possible, that is, to attain a state determined by the striving subject’s essence alone. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory, which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism, we follow Michael Della Rocca's formulation, in which 3D explains persistence in virtue (...) of same entities and 4D in virtue of distinct entities. SNT is a 3D'ist position because it accounts for the persistence of simple substances in virtue of diachronically identical ‘nuclear’ tropes. The nuclear tropes of a simple substance are necessary for it and mutually rigidly dependent but distinct. SNT explains qualitative change by tropes that are contingent to a simple substance. We show that it avoids the standard problems of 3D: temporal relativization of ontic predication, Bradley's regress and coincidence, fission and fusion cases. The temporal relativization is avoided because of the analysis of temporary parts that SNT gives in terms of temporal sub-location, which is atemporal part–whole relation. (shrink)

Rather infamously, Kit Fine provided a series of counter-examples which purport to show that the modalist program of analysing essence in terms of metaphysical necessity is fundamentally misguided. Several would-be modalists have since responded, attempting to save the position from this Finean Challenge. This paper evaluates and rejects a trio of such responses, from Della Rocca, Zalta, and Gorman. But I’m not here arguing for Fine’s conclusion – ultimately, this is a fight amongst friends, with Della (...) class='Hi'>Rocca, Zalta, Gorman, and I all wanting to be modalists, but disagreeing on the details. As such, while my primary aim is to show what’s wrong with this trio, the secondary aim is demonstrating how what’s right about them in fact pushes one towards my own sparse modalist account. So while the primary conclusion of this paper is negative, the secondary, positive, conclusion is that modalists shouldn’t give up hope – plausible responses to Fine are still out there. (shrink)

In 2019, Christia Mercer has published a paper in which she does a reassessment of the 2015 debate between Garber and Della Rocca on what would be the correct interpretation of Spinoza. Following Mercer, the two philosophers instantiated two main positions regarding the concept and the methodology of doing history of philosophy, namely, contextualism and appropriationism. As Mercer puts it, it is pivoted around the acceptance or rejection of one single principle, i.e. the "Getting Things right Constraint" (GTRC) (...) which can be rendered as the clause that forbids the attribution of claims or ideas to historical figures without concern for whether or not they are ones the figures would recognize as their own. However, rather than be an undoubtful principle, it conceals a great number of tough questions about the very meaning of what names the “Austrian approach” to the history of philosophy, this paper aims to unfold some aspects of Brentano’s “philosophy of history of philosophy” to look for his contributions to a problem that was already present at the origins of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles , according to which two objects are identical if they share all the same properties, has come in for much criticism. Michael Della Rocca has recently defended PII on the grounds that it is needed to forestall the possibility that where there appears to be only one object present, there is actually a multiplicity of exactly-overlapping such objects. Katherine Hawley has criticized this approach for violating a plausible “ground rule” in applying (...) rules of indiscernibility to questions of identity: where there is putative duplication, it must be qualitatively significant. Hawley further suggests that with this rule in hand, one can tell the difference between the presence of one and two indiscernible objects without recourse to either PII or brute, nonqualitative individuation. In this paper, I critically examine Hawley’s contention and find that her appeal to “qualitatively significant duplication” fails since its application to distinct indiscernibles involves a difference that is primarily quantitative anyway. The upshot is a different proposed set of “ground rules” for applying the criterion of qualitative difference when seeking a grounding or explanation for distinctness and identity. (shrink)

To początkowy fragment mowy O godności człowieka Pico della Mirandoli." Wstępem poprzedział Danilo Facca, przełożyli Zbigniew Nerczuk i Mikołaj Olszewski. -/- This is an excerpt from the Polish translation of Pico della Mirandola's De dignitate hominis. The preface to the translation by Danilo Facca. Translation by Zbigniew Nerczuk and Mikołaj Olszewski.

The immediate occasion for this special issue was Christia Mercer’s influential paper “The Contextualist Revolution in Early Modern Philosophy”. In her paper, Mercer clearly demarcates two methodologies of the history of early modern philosophy. She argues that there has been a silent contextualist revolution in the past decades, and the reconstructivist methodology has been abandoned. One can easily get the impression that ‘reconstructivist’ has become a pejorative label that everyone outright rejects. Mercer’s examples of reconstructivist historians of philosophy are deceased (...) (P. F. Strawson, Margaret J. Osler, Richard Watson, and Bernard Williams), anonymous (the fans of philosopher* mentioned by Lisa Downing), or authors whose more recent work followed a contextualist methodology (Jonathan Bennett). The reconstructivist camp seems to have turned into a shadowy group, largely extinct by now, not unlike the Death Eaters in the fictional universe of Harry Potter. There are some figures who previously belonged to this group, but they have since reformed their ways – or so it seems. Sometimes it is rumoured that certain people may still have secret allegiance to it, but no one dares to fly its banner openly. We decided to create this special issue because we believe that reconstructivist methodology does not deserve this shadowy existence. (shrink)

Motivated by recent political trends surrounding the legality of abortion, and noting the apparent difficulty with which partisan agreement can be found when engaging with arguments from foetal personhood, this paper revisits a classic axiological argument for the legalisation of abortion which relies on a commitment to the moral relevancy of consequences and the empirically sound nature of said consequences. Academically known as the Argument from Back-Street Abortion, agreement with the argument's premises entails the legalisation of abortion is morally obligatory, (...) and agreement to said argument's premises are possible regardless of one's position regarding a foetus' right-to-life. As such, this oft-overlooked argument deserves revisiting due to its potential for bipartisan reconciliation in service of the establishment of ethical abortion policy. (shrink)

SUMMARY. The works of Alexander of Aphrodisias were written a few decades after the publication of the most successful -astrology hand- book in antiquity, Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos Syntaxis, which attempts to naturalize astrology, i.e. to make it agree with Aristotelian theory of science. A comparison of the doctrines between the Tetrabiblos and some passages of Alexander'p works on fate demostrates a noteworthy con¬vergere of the two scholars, and probably a dependence of the lasi great greek Aristotle's exegete on the theories of (...) Ptolemaic astrology, at least in reference to three points: theory of fate; justification of de- vining as a technical and naturai conjecture about man's fate; ana¬lysis of the stars' influence on the sublunary world in physical and phi¬losophical terms. (shrink)

Twenty years ago I put a sign on the door to my office —and it’s still there— with the sentence of Peirce that I have used in my title: "The life of science is in the desire to learn" (CP 1.235, c.1902). I learned this quote from the late professor of logic at MIT, George Boolos. Like him, I put it on my door to invite students to come in to inquire, to ask questions, since their questions are not just (...) the life of science, but also the sparks that inflame my passion for teaching. Those —professors and students— who desire to learn are the real agents, the main characters, of philosophical development. Philosophy should not be understood and taught as the transmission of old solutions to outdated problems, but as a way of life devoted to learning the truth wherever we might find it. My exposition will be divided into four sections: 1) A brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional scientist and a scientific philosopher; 2) Peirce considered as an educational philosopher; 3) Some practical suggestions I have drawn from Peirce's ideas and from my experience teaching philosophy today; and finally, 4) A brief conclusion. (shrink)

This text highlights not only how highly Charles S. Peirce esteems philosophical study, but also the close connection between philosophy and science, something he always emphasized. For Peirce, as for medieval scholars, philosophy —even metaphysics— should be pursued with a scientific attitude. I believe following his counsel here is essential to thinking about how philosophy should be taught today. -/- My exposition is divided into four sections: 1) A brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional scientist (...) and a scientific philosopher; 2) Peirce considered as an educational philosopher; 3) Some practical suggestions I have drawn from Peirce's ideas and from my experience teaching philosophy today; and finally, 4) A brief conclusion. (shrink)

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) decided to study all the ancient and medieval schools of philosophy, including the Pre-Socratics, in order to broaden his scope. Pico showed interest in ancient monists. He commented that only Xenophanes’ One is the One simply, while Parmenides’ One is not the absolute One, but the oneness of Being. Melissus’ One is in extreme correspondence to that of Xenophanes. As for Xenophanes, Pico seems to have fallen victim of ancient sources, who referred to Xenophanes (...) and Parmenides as members of the Eleatic “tribe”. In the case of Parmenides Pico draws mainly on the Platonic dialogues Parmenides and Sophist and not on intermediaries such as the Neoplatonists and other commentators. Despite of Pico’s knowledge of Empedocles’ philosophy, it is worth noticing that Pico was also strongly influenced by the medieval kabbalistic literature and the pseudo Empedocles. While Neoplatonists, such as Proclus, commented Empedocles and interpreted him according to the Neoplatonic spectrum, Pico’s appreciation of the philosophy of Empedocles was mediated through Arab and Jewish mysticism. Pico counted among his sources the Pre-Socratics, but the way he read them was not always direct and consistent. He intentionally chose to interpret them through the spectrum of intermediaries such as the ancient Commentators, the Neoplatonists, the Arabs and Jews mystics. (shrink)

Shamik Dasgupta (2016) proposes to tame the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to apply to only non-autonomous facts, which are facts that are apt for explanation. Call this strategy to tame the PSR the taming strategy. In a recent paper, Della Rocca (2020a) argues that proponents of the taming strategy, in attempting to formulate a restricted version of the PSR, nevertheless find themselves committed to endorsing a form of radical monism, which, in turn, leads right back to an (...) untamed-PSR. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Della Rocca is right. My question is this: Is there reason to believe the principle of sufficient reason (in its untamed version)? In this paper, I argue that it is impossible for there to be a reason to believe the untamed-PSR. (shrink)

La Cappella Carafa di Santa Severina, nella chiesa di San Domenico Maggiore a Napoli, era uno dei luoghi preferiti della giovinezza di Giordano Bruno. La sua struttura, che ricorda il teatro di Giulio Camillo, e la presenza di trenta simboli astrologici scolpiti sugli archi, la rendono la “stanza della memoria” ideale per l’applicazione dell’innovativa arte della memoria sviluppata dal filosofo Nolano. -/- The ‘memory place’ of Giordano Bruno. The Carafa of Santa Severina Chapel in the church of (...) San Domenico Maggiore, Naples, was one of the favourite places of Giordano Bruno’s youth. Its structure, similar to that of Giulio Camillo’s theatre, and the presence of thirty astrological symbols carved on the arches, make it the ideal ‘memory place’ for the application of the innovative ‘art of memory’ developed by the philosopher. (shrink)

This paper replies to Claudio La Rocca's criticisms of my account of Kant's views on concept formation. On my account, Kant holds that, although all conscious experiences of adult human beings are informed by the categories, it is possible to represent objects by means of non-conceptualized intuitions. La Rocca rejects that claim. In this paper, I first discuss the passages cited by La Rocca. I then argue that Kant's account of the formation of the categories presupposes that (...) it is possible to represent and group objects without employing any concepts. (shrink)

"Patterns of psychoanalysis and theory of recognition. Axel Honneth’s intersubjective psyche". An overview of the several scopes and patterns used over time by Axel Honneth in his “theory of recognition” is presented. After a discussion of the use of object relations theory (especially with reference to D.W. Winnicott’s contributions) in Honneth’s 1992 book Struggle for Recognition, the theoretical revision of psychoanalysis in light of his theory of recognition is examined. Finally, Honneth’s suggestion of a new alliance between a renewed “critical (...) theory” and psychoanalysis, which concerns also the dimension of political psychology, is discussed. -/- Viene offerta una panoramica sui differenti usi e le diverse forme di psicoanalisi utilizzate da Axel Honneth in relazione alla sua “teoria del riconoscimento” nel corso del tempo. Dopo una discussione dell’uso della teoria delle relazioni oggettuali (soprattutto nella concezione di D.W. Winnicott) in Lotta per il riconoscimento, del 1992, si prende in esame la revisione della psicoanalisi operata in termini di teoria del riconoscimento. Infine viene discussa la proposta di una nuova alleanza tra una “teoria critica” rinnovata e la psicoanalisi, che contempla anche il versante della psicologia politica. (shrink)

Fürwahrhalten, or “holding-to-be-true”, is one of the most controversial concepts in Kant’s epistemology. Rarely mentioned in Kant’s edited works – where it is often used to describe moral faith – Fürwahrhalten has attracted the interest of Kant scholars only in recent years. The essay aims to shed light on some of the main issues that the notion of holding-to-be-true still rises, especially those concerning its origin and its theoretical function in the critical system. The book retraces the stages of Kant’s (...) reflection on this theme, starting from the precritical discussion with the main representatives of the German Enlightenment (Wolff, Knutzen, Baumgarten, Meier, and Crusius) to the definitive formulation of Fürwahrhalten after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. The analysis of Kant’s logical corpus has shown that, far from being a marginal concept of critical epistemology, Fürwahrhalten is the core of a systematic theory of certainty, that Kant develops in accordance with his doctrine of modality. This theory represents the arrival point of a long and troubled reflection, that led Kant to deeply rethink most of the traditional themes of eighteenth-century logic. (shrink)

Some of the manuscripts once part of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s collection transmit autograph notes, which have been useful to reconstruct his library. A peculiar case is represented by the notes transmitted in a codex containing the Latin translation of Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed. These notes are actual corrections to the translation made mostly on the basis of a comparison with the Hebrew text, while in some other cases they derive from a specific interpretation. The aim of (...) this paper is to present some characteristics of the textual revisions, in particular with reference to the Hebrew source. The palaeographic data demonstrate Pico’s direct involvement, which leads to the question of the authorship of these notes, namely if they were the result of an autonomous work or of a collaboration with some other scholar. (shrink)

Prima parte. Genealogia heideggeriana del pensiero di Luig Pareyson e di Gianni Vattimo -- Seconda parte. Ontologie ed ermeneutiche del cristianesimo -- Conclusione -- Appendice I. Intervista a Gianni Vattimo -- Appendice II. Intervista a Claudio Ciancio -- Bibliografia. Martin Heidegger ; Luigi Pareyson ; Gianni Vattimo ; Altri autori.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) focuses on Anaxagoras (ca. 500-428 BC) because he considers him as a precursor of the the later Neoplatonic concept all things exist in all things in their own mode, which became the core of Pico’s metaphysics. Anaxagoras’s philosophy permits Pico to establish his doctrine that all things share a portion of God within them, in their own way. Pico rejects the fixed position of man in the ontological hierarchy. Man has the chance to become (...) everything. Pico asserts that man contains all things in himself as their center, just like God contains all things as their origin. As a consequence, Anaxagoras’s principle is supportive to Pico’s metaphysics. Furthermore, Anaxagoras’s metaphysical principle is supportive of Pico’s method of allegorical interpretation, which is indispensable for his syncretism and his attempt to reveal hidden truths in every text or level of reality. (shrink)

Il saggio tratta della figura di Empedocle – pensiero e uomo insieme, per­fettamente coerenti uno con l’altro – considerandolo come un pensatore di confine, un symbolon, nel quale s’incontrano senza fondersi e senza pre­varicarsi due universi, quello del mythos e quello del logos, con tutte le lo­ro rispettive e complesse implicazioni. Tutto ciò è necessario per com­prendere la lettura che Empedocle presenta della physis, processo naturale e modo di essere ad un tempo, che si esplicita nelle quattro radici (...) – acqua, aria, terra e fuoco – che costituiscono il tutto, relazionandosi attraverso Philia e Neikos, le due forze contrarie e polari che tengono insieme l’es­sere uno e molteplice. The essay deals with the Empedocle’s figure – both man and mind per­fectly acting consistently each other – considering him like a border thin­ker, a symbolon, in wich two universes, one of the mythos and one of the logos with their respective and complex implications, meet without mixing and without prevaricating. All this is necessary to understand the Empe­docle’s reading about the physis, either a natural process or a way of being at the same time expressing itself in four roots – water, air, land and fire – which consisted the whole reporting each other through Philia and Neikos, two opposite and polar forces that keep together the one and various being. (shrink)

This essay examines the way in which the modal concept of necessity was discussed and analyzed in some eleventh- and early twelfth-century sources, such as Peter Damian’s De divina omnipotentia, Anselm of Canterbury’s Cur deus homo and several anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione that were presumably composed in the first two decades of the twelfth century by logicians connected to William of Champeaux’s and Peter Abelard’s milieu. My aim is to offer a comparison of these different sources with respect (...) to their use of the Boethian distinction between two types or kinds of necessity, namely, the “absolute” or “simple” necessity that is involved in statements like “God is necessarily immortal” or “it is necessary for humans to be animals”, and the “conditional” or “temporal” necessity that is at stake when we say, for instance, that someone necessarily walks when he is walking. (shrink)

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola was (probably) poisoned by his secretary, Cristoforo da Casalmaggiore, as Marin Sanudo testifies in his Diarii. After Pico’s remains exhumation, some years ago, it was also supposed that the main responsible of the poisoning was Marsilio Ficino. The purpose of this paper is to trace the ‘romance’ sources of this strange supposition.

Starting with the reference to “Plato’s dictum” that Freud added in the second last page of the first edition of The Interpretation of Dreams, the author explains the convergences between the conception of dreams expounded by Plato in the Republic and Freud’s fundamental insights. The analysis of bibliographic sources used by Freud, and of his interests, allow than to suppose not only that Freud omitted to acknowledge the Plato’s theoretical genealogy of “the Via Regia to the unconscious”, but also the (...) possibility that the Republic constituted a tacit source of inspiration for the composition of The Interpretations of dreams. -/- Muovendo dal richiamo al «detto di Platone» inserito nella penultima pagina della prima edizione de "L’interpretazione dei sogni" di Freud (1899), vengono preliminarmente esposte le convergenze tra la concezione del sogno di Platone esposta ne "La Repubblica" e le intuizioni poste alla base dell’edificio freudiano. Alla luce delle fonti testuali citate e utilizzate da Freud, e dei suoi interessi, viene poi avanzata l’ipotesi che egli non soltanto abbia omesso di riconoscere la genealogia teoretica platonica della «via regia che porta alla conoscenza dell’inconscio» (p. 282), ma che l’antico dialogo abbia potuto rappresentare una fonte tacita di ispirazione per la composizione de "L’interpretazione dei sogni". (shrink)

The attention paid in the Giornale critico della filosofia italiana to the major exponents of seventeenth-century philosophical rationalism, from its foundation by Giovanni Gentile in 1920 until 1979, reveals important changes that provide us with interesting information on Italian Neo-idealism. The small number of articles on Descartes can be interpreted as the result of an overall approach – sanctioned by Gentile – different from that of Hegel, who considered Descartes as the founder of modern philosophy. For Gentile, Descartes represents (...) a stage in the history of philosophy spanning from Humanism to Spinoza, and, in a more particular Italian perspective, from Campanella to Vico. This interpretative scheme persisted also under the direction of Ugo Spirito, when Cartesianism continued to receive little theoretical and historical attention, with the exception of Eugenio Garin’s contributions. In the years from 1945 to 1979, the Giornale critico emphasized instead the interest for Spinoza, a very important author for Gentile, up to the double monographic issue published on the occasion of the third centenary of Spinoza’s death (1977). In turn, the lack of interest for Leibniz was constant and evident from the small number of articles published from 1920 to 1979, which were furthermore not particularly connected with the international, coeval Leibniz scholarship. (shrink)

The discussion on the 900 Conclusiones projected and sponsored by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in Rome was cut short by the condemnation of 13 of them by the papal commission in 1487. Princeps Concordiae’s counter-arguments presented in his Apologia, published in the same year, can not be certainly considered a disputatio as Pico had called for; the papal intervention removed in this way the possibility to have a better acquaintance with a work which is still a very difficult one, (...) just for its “unfinished” form. Pedro Garsia’s Determinationes magistrales against Pico’s Apologia are a very poor reply to Pico. In this paper Pico’s arguments against some of the condemned Conclusiones are considered as well as Pedro Garsia’s counter-arguments. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola displays a deep familiarity with medieval logical and semantical doctrines, while Pedro Garsia’s arguments betray a solid ignorance. (shrink)

In "La science et l’hypothèse" Henri Poincaré scrive: «Compito dello scienziato è ordinare; si fa la scienza con i fatti, come si fa una casa con le pietre; ma un cumulo di fatti non è una scienza, proprio come un mucchio di pietre non è una casa» . Oltre a richiamare qualcosa che a molti potrebbe persino apparire ovvio – cioè che la scienza non possa in alcun modo ridursi ad un mero agglomerato di fatti che il ricercatore registra in (...) ambito osservativo, ma richieda piuttosto un attento processo di elaborazione razionale sia in fase preventiva rispetto al contesto dell’esperienza, sia in fase di valutazione dei dati sperimentali raccolti – questa affermazione ha il merito di ricordarci qualcosa che spesso viene passato sotto silenzio, vale a dire il fatto che durante il nostro tentativo di comprendere il mondo si dia alla conoscenza una materia, un complesso di "oggetti", tale da risultare determinante nella costruzione e nella formulazione delle nostre teorie. Se questo è vero, si può quindi parlare di una materia, e di una forma da essa distinta, della conoscenza scientifica, sebbene con alcune precisazioni. Nel contributo si preciserà questa distinzione facendo riferimento alle assiomatizzazioni di alcune discipline scientifiche condotte nella prima metà del secolo scorso. (shrink)

Introduction. The book is a study in Adam Smith's system of ideas; its aim is to reconstruct the peculiar framework that Adam Smith’s work provided for the shaping of a semi-autonomous new discipline, political economy; the approach adopted lies somewhere in-between the history of ideas and the history of economic analysis. My two claims are: i) The Wealth of Nations has a twofold structure, including a `natural history' of opulence and an `imaginary machine' of wealth. The imaginary machine is a (...) kind of Newtonian theory, whose connecting links are principles; provided either by `partial' characteristics of human nature or by analoga of physical mechanisms transferred to the social world; ii) a domain of the economic, understood as a self-standing social sub-system, was discovered first by Adam Smith. His `discovery' of the new continent of the economic was an `unintended result' of a deviation in his voyage to the never-found archipelago of natural jurisprudence. -/- 1. Imaginary machines and invisible chains: natural philosophy and method. The first chapter reconstructs Smith's views on the method in natural philosophy, presented primarily in the History of Astronomy (HA). The peculiar kind of semi-sceptical Newtonianism which permeates the essay is highlighted. Its reconstruction of the history of one natural science is shown to be based on the assumptions of Hume’s epistemology, and to lead to a self-aware deadlock. Smith's dilemma is between an essentialist realism and sceptical instrumentalism; the Cartesian presuppositions he shares with Hume and with the 18th century as a whole make it impossible for him to overcome his dilemma. The following chapters will show how, on the one hand, Smith's skeptical methodology encourages him in the enterprise to `carve off' a new self-contained discipline and how, on the other hand, his epistemological dilemma is reflected in the inner tensions of his moral and political theory as well as in a number of basic oscillations concerning the status of the new discipline. -/- 2. Chessboards and clocks: moral philosophy and method. -/- The second chapter reconstructs Smith's views on the method in the parallel field of moral philosophy, including the theory of moral sentiments and natural jurisprudence. I argue that The Theory of Moral Sentiments, when considered together with with the Lectures on Jurisprudence, where Smith's peculiar version of a `weaker' form of natural law is presented, wins special interest, not only for the history of ethics but even more for the history of political theory and the social sciences. The two most striking features of Smith's work in this area are highlighted. First, his effort at reformulating the `practical science' is a methodologically self-aware attempt at applying the Newtonian method to moral subjects. Secondly, this attempt ends in a stalemate as two distinguished kinds of normative order are introduced: one ultimate order of Reason, ultimately justifiable but inaccessible, and one weaker order of our `natural sentiments', to which we have empirical access, but which is so variable as to lack any ultimate value as a basis for grounding our normative claims. These two parallel conundrums may arguably account for the author's inability to publish during his lifetime both The History of Astronomy and the projected history and theory of law and government. -/- 3. Wheels, dams, and gravitation: the structure of scientific argument in The Wealth of Nations. -/- The third chapter provides the core of the book, dealing with the structure of the argument in WN. I argue that the main presupposition that makes the shift possible from a `natural history' to a `system' approach is the Newtonian contrast of `mathematical' with `physical' explanation; that is, Smith drops any discussion of the "original qualities" of human nature that could account for economic behaviour, while introducing, as `principles' for the system, a set of `hypothetical' statements of `observed' regularities in human behaviour and of `observed' super-individual self-regulating mechanisms. In bringing this presupposition to light, the coexistence of a teleological with a mechanistic approach is clarified; fresh light is shed on the notion of the invisible hand by a comparison of its occurrence in Smith with the occurrence of the same expression (until now overlooked) in the correspondence between Newton and Cotes. Finally, the peculiar semi-prescriptive and semi-descriptive character of political economy are highlighted, and the consistency of Smith's `impure' semi-prescriptive social science, when understood in his own terms, is defended against familiar charges with inconsistency and against even more familiar strained modernizations. -/- 4. Apples, deer, and frivolous trinkets: the construction of the economic. -/- The fourth chapter draws consequences from the third, examining how Smith's achievement in political economy, marking its transition to scientific status, carried a re-description of the phenomena, creating the comparatively independent and unified field of the economic. Smith's achievement is interpreted not as the `discovery' of an autonomous character already possessed by the economy out there, so much as a Gestalt-switch by which our perception of social phenomena is modified making us `see' the partial order of the economy as an isolated system. To sum up, the autonomy of the economic in social reality and the autonomy of the economic in social consciousness are shown to be two sides of one process. -/- 5. Concluding considerations: Political economy and the Enlightenment halved. -/- A few suggestions on the status of economic theory two centuries after The Wealth of Nations in its relationship to ‘practical philosophy’ are illustrated. (shrink)

The Catena aurea entium of Henry of Herford is part of the work of re-elaboration of Aristotle’s natural-philosophical corpus, which characterised the European intellectual environment in the Late Middle Ages. In the central books of his encyclopaedia, Henry comments on the works of natural philosophy of Albert the Great, placing himself in continuity with the cultural project started by Albert in Cologne. The present article aims to compare the 5th book of the Catena aurea entium, which consists of a comment (...) per modum quaestionis on the Meteora of Albert the Great, with some meteorological quaestiones composed between the 13th and 15th centuries. This analysis will lead me to grasp the philosophical orientations and interpretation of Henry and also his reception of Albert the Great’s meteorology. In the 5th book, Henry introduces an extensive medical section taken from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, in which he applies the Galenic medical principles to meteorology. Besides, in the quaestio 105 (V 1 105), he interprets Albert through the theological-poetic explanation of ancient origins on the sacrality of the number three and an excerpt from the Liber proverbiorum. (shrink)

The paper presents a critique of Marcuse’s theory of “false needs”. It aims to clear the theoretical ground necessary to sketch out an immanent critique of the socio-economical dynamics that dictate the exhausting, and oft endless postponement of the satisfaction of a multiplicity of mass needs and desires. The paper focuses its attention on some paradoxes produced by Marcuse’s theory, correlated in particular with the critique of the wellbeing of the masses, and with the manipulative superpower ascribed to ideology. These (...) paradoxes are interpreted as expressions of a radical distance between critic and the social reality and of a paternalistic drift, which can both be overcome by the introduction of a immanent critique. -/- Il contributo presenta una critica della teoria dei “falsi bisogni” di Marcuse. Tale critica è volta a liberare lo spazio teorico necessario per impostare una critica immanente delle dinamiche socio-economiche che impongono un estenuante e spesso infinito differimento della soddisfazione di una molteplicità di desideri e bisogni di massa. Ci si sofferma su alcuni paradossi generati dalla teoria di Marcuse, correlati in particolare alla critica rivolta al benessere raggiunto dalle masse, ed allo strapotere manipolatorio attribuito all’ideologia. Tali paradossi vengono interpretati come espressione di un radicale distacco tra il critico e la realtà sociale, e di una sua deriva paternalistica, che possono essere superati attraverso l’adozione di una critica di tipo immanente. (shrink)

Tommaso Giannini was a prominent professor at the ferrarese Studium between sixteenth and seventeenth century. Probably influenced by Platonic sympathies nurtured by the Court and partly by the University milieu, in 1587 he published his first work titled De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platonicorum liber unus, which was a catalyst for his academic career. A compilative work in essence, the De providentia displays a large amount of sources always tacitly used: Marsilio Ficino, Jacques Charpentier, Giulio Serina, Stefano Tiepolo, Teofilo (...) Zimara, Bessarion, Agostino Steuco and amid the ancients Plotinus, Plutarcus, Sirianus, Proclus, Giamblicus, Apuleius, Calcidius, Ammonius, Psellus. A small place is reserved to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and precisely to his Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem. The aim of the paper is to provide a supplement of analysis of Giannini’s interest in Pico’s works considering his later writings, each one commonly identified as Disputationes Aristotelicae. (shrink)

Il breve saggio si propone di esaminare la centralità della figura materna nell’opera di un ingegnoso costruttore di storie della letteratura italiana del Novecento: Alberto Moravia. La scelta dell’Autore nasce dalla rilevanza della tematica nella sua opera, in cui peraltro è quasi sempre assente il punto di vista femminile delle “voci” delle donne. Ciò sembra paradossale e questa circostanza è di grande interesse critico. In particolare, a dispetto delle interpretazioni più canoniche, secondo cui Moravia – negli scritti (...) realizzati tra il 1929 e il 1964 – ha inteso compiere una “distruzione” dell’immagine materna nel quadro di una visione pessimista della famiglia borghese, dovremo considerare un più complesso e articolato universo materno nello scrittore romano, in cui è possibile ricostruire cinque modelli – la “madre autoritaria”, la “madre-non madre”, la “madre padrona”, la “madre-angelo custode” e la “madre-seduttrice” –, ben esemplificati nei principali romanzi ma che si ritrovano nei racconti che Moravia scrive ininterrottamente dagli anni Trenta agli anni Sessanta, la cui mole ha determinato, ancor oggi, una mancanza di studi sistematici. In secondo luogo, la tematica della madre sarà esaminata nelle trasposizioni cinematografiche italiane delle opere letterarie di Moravia. Va ricordato che il rapporto dello scrittore con il cinema fu particolarmente intenso. Per un verso, la “settima arte” rivestì un ruolo non secondario nella formazione ed esperienza estetica dell’Autore romano, che al cinema si interessò anche professionalmente nelle vesti di critico cinematografico, a partire dal primo dopoguerra, dapprima, per La nuova Europa e Libera stampa, poi, per L’Europeo e L’Espresso, a cui dobbiamo aggiungere l’attività di saggista per numerose riviste specializzate. Per altro verso, il cinema italiano non solo ha attinto a “mani basse” dall’opera di Moravia per sceneggiature di pellicole, che furono pietre miliari della sua storia. L’elenco dei romanzi e racconti adattati al grande schermo rende conto della grande influenza nella cultura italiana degli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta: La provinciale (1953) di Mario Soldati, La romana (1954) di Luigi Zampa, Peccato che sia una canaglia (1954) di Alessandro Blasetti, Racconti romani (1955) di Gianni Franciolini, La ciociara (1960) di Vittorio de Sica, La giornata balorda (1960) di Mauro Bolognini, Risate di gioia (1960) di Mario Monicelli, Agostino (o la perdita dell’innocenza) (1962) di Mauro Bolognini, La noia (1963) di Damiano Damiani, Gli indifferenti (1964) di Francesco Maselli, Le ore nude (1964) di Marco Vicario, La donna invisibile (1969) di Paolo Spinola, Una ragazza piuttosto complicata (1969) di Damiano Damiani, L’amore coniugale (1970) di Dacia Maraini, Il conformista (1970) di Bernardo Bertolucci, e molti altri ancora. Come avremo modo soltanto di accennare, il successo della letteratura moraviana nel mondo del cinema italiano si deve a molteplici fattori, tra cui la raffigurazione dei personaggi e degli ambienti, la focalizzazione su certe tematiche e, non da ultimo, lo stile narrativo, particolarmente adatto alle trasposizioni cinematografiche. Come caso di studio, ci soffermeremo, infine, sulla figura materna della versione filmica de La noia di Damiani, con l’obiettivo di verificare se nel passaggio dal libro alla pellicola, quella particolare connotazione della madre autoritaria abbia subito delle alterazioni. L’ipotesi che muove l’analisi è che la stesura delle sceneggiature, la raffigurazione dei personaggi e la messa in scena delle sequenze filmiche facciano emergere un riadattamento adeguato al largo pubblico, con il sovvertimento dell’andamento cronologico, alcune “lacune” di ordine psicologico nella raffigurazione dei protagonisti e un certo cedimento moralistico alla cultura ancora dominante negli anni ’50 e ’60, in cui la figura materna, sia quando è incattivita dalla povertà che quando è inaridita dalla ricchezza, anela comunque agli affetti familiari, trovando in essi una qualche forma di redenzione. (shrink)

Analysing Cassirer's positions in the Nachruf dedicated to Natorp (1925) and in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929), I will try in this short paper to outline the core, merits, and limitations of Natorp's psychology in Cassirer's interpretation. In doing so, I will emphasise three elements: 1. the cornerstones of Natorpian psychology, which for Cassirer represent Natorp's main contribution to the history of ideas; 2. the thematic unity of Natorp's philosophical production; 3. the fundamental continuity between (...) Natorp's research and that of Cassirer. These three aspects are interwoven and belong in some way to the inner development of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a non-normative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, “norms”, “commitments”, and “obligations” are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear in (...) a disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the normativist idea that the normative does not reduce to the causal: he claims that social science succeeds in the reduction. This claim is presented as a major challenge to philosophical normativism. In what follows, I try to discuss some aspects of Turner’s challenge by focusing on certain features of belief and belief-change that prima facie promote a normativist view: this is the basis to focus on some problems concerning the scope of Turner’s argument. (shrink)

Botticelli and Tizian depict the Annunciation in two very different ways. Botticelli portrays a kneeling angel in an act of guiding from below, while Tizian represents an angel imposing himself from above with an authoritarian forefinger. Botticelli's painting suggests an intention of orientation that is not authoritarian yet able to bring about a transformation (Umbildung). It also suggests that an individual's transformation cannot be achieved in a closed solipsistic dimension, but requires a disclosure from otherness. My theory is that at (...) the origin of ethics there is a non-authoritarian way of orientation that comes from otherness and arises from the emotional sphere thanks to a "care of desire". The expression cura sui has often been interpreted as a care confined to a private and solipsistic dimension with the aim of strengthening the self-referential subject. By "care of desire" I mean a care not turned upon itself but made possible by a disclosure coming from otherness and addressed to the transformation of the individual and of society. In the human existence, emotions reveal an extraordinary plasticity. They are not already regulated by instinct but develop and get to maturity even many years after biological birth. Moreover, this maturation process does not follow a universal process identical for everyone, being different for every individual. In fact it finds its realization in the unique order of feelings (ordo amoris) that characterizes every individual. Emotions guide actions and the way we interact with the others and with the world. In the human existence they become plastic and don't have only a homeostatic function of self-regulation. They give flexibility to our way of perceiving, of existing and of taking our position in the world. The care of desire is dedicated to the plasticity of emotions and makes ethics, i.e. a person's formation process (Bildung) and flourishing, possible. It also allows the transition from the “environmental closedness” (Umweltgeschlossenheit) to the world-openness (Weltoffenheit). To sum up, the care of desire implies the transition from a solipsistic self-care to a “care for world-openness”. From this point of view, emotion is no more the secondary result of a cognitive process, but at the origin of every formative, perceptive and cognitive process: In the beginning was the emotion. Yet in this process of creative transformation not every emotion has the same significance: at the core of emotions’ plasticity there are love and wonder (thaumàzein), whose peculiar feature is “lack of envy” (aphthonoi). (shrink)

William Gilbert’s work, De magnete (1600), often is referred to as the first monographic study on magnetism in the early-modern period. Recently, however, it has been argued that the Jesuit, Leonardo Garzoni, wrote an experimental study on the subject twenty years earlier and that his research influenced particularly the work of Giambattista Della Porta and Paolo Sarpi,two important protagonists in the history of studies in magnetism. However, to date, Garzoni’s authorship of an anonymous treatise in manuscript, located at the (...) Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan, and taken to bear witness to his research, has been based only on circumstantial evidence. This article outlines the identification of two further manuscript copies of this treatise, which have not been studied so far. It shall be argued that the evidence contained in these manuscripts corroborates the assumption that Garzoni indeed is the author of the work that was transmitted anonymously. Moreover, it can be shown that the work was completed and prepared for print later on. These findings also allow us to argue more conclusively that Paolo Sarpi knew Garzoni’s work and passed it to Giambattista Della Porta, who bequethed his copy to the Accademia dei Lincei and thereby made it available to some of the academy’s most important members, Nicolas Claude Fabri de Peiresc and Cassiano Dal Pozzo. Finally, the dynamics of this textual transmission provide insights into how scholars approached the study of ‘magnetism’ in the early-modern period. (shrink)

Man avoids solitude through _divertissement_ because he is afraid of what staying alone entails: thinking about himself (Pascal). Furthermore, man seeks isolation in order to gain ambition and reputation (Montaigne). However, solitude is really different from isolation and it is a fundamental emotional condition. Heidegger’s analysis of the forms of boredom adapts to and relates to the specific dynamic of solitude, showing that it is a part of human being’s structure despite his experience appearing controversial. Even if man lives in (...) modern apartments and one-room apartments, he is in a condition of co-isolation (Sloterdijk) that differs from solitude. There is a space solitude (Foucault) that involves – or can involve – human isolation, but we only experience essential solitude in sleep (Merleau-Ponty, Blanchot, Perec) where man detached himself from himself and he is really alone, from himself and the others. The forms of solitude lead the analysis towards impersonal activity. (shrink)

We provide an overview of Searle's contributions to speech act theory and the ontology of social reality, focusing on his theory of constitutive rules. In early versions of this theory, Searle proposed that all such rules have the form 'X counts as Y in context C' formula – as for example when Barack Obama (X) counts as President of the United States (Y) in the context of US political affairs. Crucially, the X and the Y terms are here identical. A (...) problem arises for this theory for cases involving 'free-standing Y terms', as for example in the case of money in a computerized bank account. Here there is no physical X to which a status function might be attached. We conclude by arguing that Searle's response to this problem creates difficulties for his naturalistic framework. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how the invention of imaginary logic by Nikolaj A. Vasil’ev, forerunner of various logical and metaphysical theories appeared in the 20th century, is grounded on a revaluation of Aristotelian ontology. I shall introduce the reason why Aristotle believes that the study of the principle of contradiction is part of ontology (§ 2); I shall explain why Vasil’ev considers the law of contradiction an empirical law, and not a logical one (§ 3.1). I (...) will show his conception of contradiction (§ 3.2) and I will discuss how he believes that it’s possible to renounce this law; (§ 3.3). I shall then explain the fundamental features of imaginary logic (§ 4.1 and § 4.2); and, finally I shall claim how, in spite of a convergence from the logical point of view (§ 5.1), the incompatibility of the two authors takes place on an ontological level (§ 5.2). In order to do so, I shall implement the analysis of the Aristotelian syllogistic conducted by the Polish logician and philosopher Jan Łukasiewicz, together with a crucial distinction between two concepts: the one of ‘law’ and the one of ‘principle’. -/- . (shrink)

Un'introduzione ad alcune delle idee principali della filosofia di Thomas Reid, scritta per la traduzione italiana del saggio sulla memoria, dai "Saggi sui poteri intellettuali dell'uomo".